![]() Thus, it seems as though Russia feared that Georgia and Ukraine could provide prosperity and opportunity to their people outside of the Russian alliance system, which in turn could also potentially surpass what Russia is able to offer its own people as well. Both Georgia’s and Ukraine's economies had been on the rise right before their respective invasions. In comparison, in late 2021 and right before the 2022 invasion, Ukrainian GDP expanded 5.9% year-on-year in the fourth quarter of 2021, up from 2.7% the previous quarter. Georgia’s economic growth averaged 10.5% per year between 20. Aside from the general paranoia stemming from the “color revolutions” that occurred throughout the region in the 2000s, he has also long feared economic development and democratic contagion coming from Georgia and Ukraine. Here we should emphasize the domestic-foreign policy nexus Putin’s wars are a continuation of domestic politics. The second motivating force behind Putin’s actions in 20 is regime survival. This was perhaps clearest in his speech in Munich in 2007, when he called the dissolution of the Soviet Union a “ geopolitical tragedy.” For these reasons, we can assume both wars have been driven by political goals rather than Russian material security concerns. Putin is visibly pining for recognition both within Russia as well as abroad as the leader who, against all odds, managed to restore Russia’s long-lost greatness. Lastly, Russia is a nuclear power, and as a former Cold War superpower, Putin has been vocal about his mission to revive its previous great power status. We did not see this happen either, with the exception of Kaliningrad and the Black Sea. Second, if Putin were genuinely frightened of NATO enlargement toward Russia, he would have moved his military closer to NATO borders as soon as the alliance expanded in 2004. ![]() First, since the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest when neither Georgia nor Ukraine succeeded in securing a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), tangible accession discussions for the two countries have largely stalled and will likely remain this way for the foreseeable future. However, the link between Putin’s wars against Georgia and Ukraine and Russia’s national security are tenuous. They also claim this is why negotiations have failed. ![]() foreign policy establishment lacks “cognitive empathy” and fails to account for rational Russian strategic anxieties. International relations realists share this argument and assume that the U.S. Since his speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin has continuously insisted on the urgent need to counter NATO’s further eastward expansion as a national security imperative. To begin with, in both cases the Kremlin’s decision to invade was driven by political objectives rather than material security. While there are similarities, we argue that overstating them leads to a deeper misunderstanding of both conflicts and leaves out significant differences that need to be addressed.īefore we turn to the differences, it is worth noting the similarities between the two conflicts. ![]() ![]() Some headlines have focused on establishing parallels between the two, which suggests that Vladimir Putin is re-enacting his “Georgia playbook” in Ukraine. But it is important to consider the differences between Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine today. There is no question that watching Ukraine under Russian attack is deeply personal for us Georgians. ![]()
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